Andrew Foltz-Morrison

Harvey’s general argument, then, runs something like this: Neoclassicism is quantitative and mathematical; radical geography is against neoclassicism; therefore, radical geography should be against the quantitative and mathematics. Such an argument is flawed, however. Although its premise might be right that neoclassical economics is quantitative and mathematical, the conclusion does not follow. You can do quantitative methods and mathematics without necessarily doing neoclassical economics. The two sets of pursuits are separate, which the conclusion fails to recognize.

So, on logical grounds Harvey (and radical geography) was wrong to reject mathematics, producing a false binary between critique and the quantitative. Historically, however, it was wrong too. Marx himself, as already argued, was sympathetic to mathematical forms of presentation. In addition, a number of the theorists invoked by geography’s quantitative revolution, and indeed some of its active participants, were radical social critics who developed their formal geographical theories partly in the name of progressive social and political change.